The ubiquity of abusive supervision in the workplace, as well as the serious repercussions that come with it, has prompted scholars to investigate the numerous dynamics of this problem. This research examines the circumstances in which subordinates react to abusive supervisory behavior. The study hypothesizes the negative impacts of abusive supervision associated with the impression of unfairness and politics in the workplace toward a subordinate deviant attitude based on current research and theoretical perspectives. According to the suggested paradigm, abusive supervision leads to subordinates' work incivility by creating an unfair and politically thrilling atmosphere in the workplace. Furthermore, the study found that political skill and work incivility are linked to each other; workers who are experts in using political tactics are not supposed to turn toward work incivility while responding to the abusive behavior of the top management. The research was based on the social exchange theory and uncertainty management theory.
In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.
The interplay of several international, regional, and local factors poses daunting challenges for deterrence stability in South Asia. The emerging revolution in the military affairs compounded with prolonged crises vis-à-vis the absence of any conflict resolution mechanism between India and Pakistan; the nuclear deterrence is budding a fragile relationship between the two nuclear-armed pugnacious belligerents of South Asia. The Indian aspirations to accumulate maximum power based on its strategic partnerships with the technologically advanced countries in the world are characterized by the classic Indian strategic thinking to establish its leadership in the region. At the same time, Pakistan's reliance on China in its quests for acquiring military hardware required for the deterrence equation seemingly remains insatiable within the framework of the stability–instability paradox. Without a holistic analysis of the political and strategic challenges, casus belli of the crises, and nuclear command and control systems dynamics between the two, it would amount to a petitio principii to draw theoretical assumptions. Therefore, this study attempts to comprehensively explain the phenomena by analyzing the challenges of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia at different levels.
In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.
The interplay of several international, regional, and local factors poses daunting challenges for deterrence stability in South Asia. The emerging revolution in the military affairs compounded with prolonged crises vis-à-vis the absence of any conflict resolution mechanism between India and Pakistan; the nuclear deterrence is budding a fragile relationship between the two nuclear-armed pugnacious belligerents of South Asia. The Indian aspirations to accumulate maximum power based on its strategic partnerships with the technologically advanced countries in the world are characterized by the classic Indian strategic thinking to establish its leadership in the region. At the same time, Pakistan's reliance on China in its quests for acquiring military hardware required for the deterrence equation seemingly remains insatiable within the framework of the stability–instability paradox. Without a holistic analysis of the political and strategic challenges, casus belli of the crises, and nuclear command and control systems dynamics between the two, it would amount to a petitio principii to draw theoretical assumptions. Therefore, this study attempts to comprehensively explain the phenomena by analyzing the challenges of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia at different levels.
The relationship between the nuclear arms race and strategic stability has been important for scholars, politicians, and journalists who have shown keen interest in what causes a state to augment its military power and its effects on its rivalries with other states. As emerging technologies continue to change the security calculus of the states, the arms race is on for investing in the development and acquisition of offensive and defensive technologies in South Asia. The Indian strategic cooperation with the technologically advanced countries and the increase in the defense budget confirm its military modernization while upsetting the delicacies of the conventional military balance in South Asia. This study gives a substantive background to the developments and technological advancements in the post overt nuclearization era (1998) in the context of complications posed by India's persistent animus dominandi to outpace Pakistan in an anarchic structure vis-à-vis its impact on strategic instability in South Asia by making a comprehensive analysis of an unending arms race for the maintenance of credible minimum deterrence.
This paper assists in understanding contesting technological capabilities and doctrinal modification between India and Pakistan that are drifting South Asia towards instability, leaving the nuclear deterrence in a dark abyss. Hawks on both sides of the nuclear armed rivals are unprecedentedly chanting threats of nuclear war. More bothersome is the indications of shifting the Indian policy of No First Use (NFU), calls for doctrinal modifications and counterforce temptations. An Indian quest for escalation dominance and Pakistani quest for stability against India is in fact a mutual struggle beyond 'minimum credible' to 'assured second strike' capabilities.
This article seeks to discuss Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and its significance for strategic stability in South Asia which is challenged by complex interactions between different players in political, military, and technological dynamics. In particular, India's easy access to technology and the challenges for Pakistan associated with fears of low-intensity conflicts due to Indian offensive strategies have resulted in dangerous instabilities. The Indian technological advancement has inevitably brought revolutionary changes in the strategic thought process thus continuously forcing Pakistan to modify or upgrade its nuclear doctrine. We argue that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is ambiguous, and the changing contours of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine are within the framework of how technological advancement navigates strategic stability in the South Asian region.
In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons.
This article seeks to discuss Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and its significance for strategic stability in South Asia which is challenged by complex interactions between different players in political, military, and technological dynamics. In particular, India's easy access to technology and the challenges for Pakistan associated with fears of low-intensity conflicts due to Indian offensive strategies have resulted in dangerous instabilities. The Indian technological advancement has inevitably brought revolutionary changes in the strategic thought process thus continuously forcing Pakistan to modify or upgrade its nuclear doctrine. We argue that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is ambiguous, and the changing contours of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine are within the framework of how technological advancement navigates strategic stability in the South Asian region.
This paper assists in understanding contesting technological capabilities and doctrinal modification between India and Pakistan that are drifting South Asia towards instability, leaving the nuclear deterrence in a dark abyss. Hawks on both sides of the nuclear armed rivals are unprecedentedly chanting threats of nuclear war. More bothersome is the indications of shifting the Indian policy of No First Use (NFU), calls for doctrinal modifications and counterforce temptations. An Indian quest for escalation dominance and Pakistani quest for stability against India is in fact a mutual struggle beyond 'minimum credible' to 'assured second strike' capabilities.
The time when the world is dealing with corona disaster, there is this fear that we might not forget about other communicable diseases. There are multiple international and national programs in place to prevent these communicable diseases. The fear is these programs might not get the attention it deserves at the time when all the attention is toward Covid-19. Currently more than 180 countries/regions have reported Covid-19 cases.1 The highly contagious measles cases have continued to increase. World Health Organization (WHO) data shows that globally measles cases rose by 300 percent in the first three months of 2019, compared to the same time period of 2018. The WHO African region has recorded a 700% increase, the Region of the Americas 60%, the European region 300%, the Eastern Mediterranean 100%, with 40% increases in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. According to statistics, it caused approximately 110,000 deaths worldwide in 2017.1,2 The point of concern is that even countries with high overall vaccination coverage like USA and Israel noted spikes in cases. United States recorded 1,282 individual cases of measles, greatest number since 1992.3 Speaking about polio, countries are still struggling with its eradication. Afghanistan, Nigeria and Pakistan are still endemic recording total of 29, 18 and 146 cases respectively in 2019.4 These are the countries currently dealing with the COVD-19 pandemic too. As of March 15, 2020, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan reported 13 new circulating vaccine derived poliovirus (cVDP2) cases, the largest number of cases the province has ever seen in a day.5 According to WHO, Lower respiratory tract infections remained the deadliest communicable disease, causing 3.0 million deaths globally in 2016. Diarrheal diseases caused 1.4 million deaths in 2016. Similarly, Tuberculosis (TB) was responsible for 1.3 million deaths globally. Lower respiratory tract infections, Diarrhea diseases and Tuberculosis are among the top ten global causes of deaths. The situation at hand demands extra measures on the part of authorities and public health experts. With the Covid-19 pandemic, trend has been observed where there is diversion of all human and budgetary resources toward Covid -19 pandemic. This pandemic and helplessness of many nations to deal with it alarms us that we are not capable of dealing with another pandemic at this time. Therefore, it is important that all those programs i.e. Immunization programs, TB, HIV, Hepatitis control programs etc. must continue at the same time. Otherwise, more deaths might result associated with these communicable diseases than the overall endeavor would save from Covid -19.
